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The Affordable Care Act as Retiree Health Insurance:  
Implications for Retirement and Social Security Claiming 
Abstract 
Using data from the Health and Retirement Study, we examine the effects of the Affordable Care 
Act (ACA) on retirement. We first calculate retirements (and in related analyses changes in 
expected ages of retirement and/or Social Security claiming) between 2010, before ACA, and 
2014, after ACA, for those with health insurance at work but not in retirement. This group 
experienced the sharpest change in retirement incentives from ACA. We then compare 
retirement measures for those with health insurance at work but not in retirement with retirement 
measures for two other groups: those who, before ACA, had employer provided health insurance 
both at work and in retirement, and those who had no health insurance either at work or in 
retirement. To complete a difference-in-difference analysis, we make the same calculations for 
members of an older cohort over the same age span. We find no evidence that ACA increases the 
propensity to retire or changes the retirement expectations of those who, before ACA, had 
coverage when working, but not when retired.  
An analysis based on a structural retirement model suggests that eventually ACA will increase 
the probability of retirement by those who initially had health insurance on the job but did not 
have employer-provided retiree health insurance. But the retirement increase is quite small, only 
about half a percentage point at each year of age. The model also suggests that much of the effect 
of ACA on retirement will be realized within a few years of the change in the law. 
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I. Introduction  
The Affordable Care Act (ACA) was passed in 2010. It increases the availability of 
health insurance for those who did not have coverage from their employer, or who were not 
working. ACA also provides a range of subsidies based on family income. It mandates standards 
for qualified plans, and imposes penalties on individuals without insurance and on certain 
employers who did not insure their full-time workers. Different provisions of the legislation 
continue to be phased in over time.1  
Policy concerns include the question of whether ACA encourages earlier retirement. 
Concern about this issue stems from the findings in an extensive literature suggesting retiree 
health insurance accelerates retirement.2 ACA may be expected to have a similar effect to retiree 
health insurance since it provides health insurance to those who would not be covered until they 
become eligible for Medicare should they choose to retire before age 65. If ACA accelerates 
retirement, this side effect might undermine decades of public policies designed to increase the 
retirement age.3  
                                                          
1 The tax on individuals who are not insured has increased from the higher of $95 per adult, or 1 
percent of household income in 2014; to $325, or 2 percent of income in 2015; to $695, or 2.5 
percent of household income in 2016. 
2 Studies of the relation of retiree health insurance to retirement include Clark (2015), Currie and 
Madrian (1999), French and Bailey Jones (2011), Gilleskie and Blau (2006), Gustman and 
Steinmeier (1994, 2000), Madrian (1994), Marton and Woodbury (2006) and Nyce et al. (2011). 
For studies of the relation between retirement and Social Security benefit claiming, see Glickman 
and Hermes (2015), Gustman and Steinmeier (2015), Henriques (2012), Shoven and Slavov 
(2012, 2014), and Song and Manchester (2007).  
3 Policies designed to encourage delayed retirement include: the increase in the Social Security 
full retirement age; the abolition of the earnings test after full retirement age; the increase in 
Social Security’s delayed retirement credit; the abolition of mandatory retirement; and 
enforcement of rules requiring defined benefit pension plans to be actuarially fair in determining 
benefits after normal retirement. 
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In contrast to the suggestion from the literature on retiree health insurance, Levy, 
Buchmueller, and Nikpay (2015) do not find any change in retirements by those younger than 65 
associated with the implementation of ACA. Their approach is to contrast changes in retirements 
through mid-2015 between individuals residing in states that participated in ACA with changes 
in retirements observed for individuals from states that did not participate. They recognize that 
too short a time may have elapsed for the full effects of ACA on retirement to be observed.4 
Nevertheless, if their analysis holds over the longer term, it would suggest there are no 
unintended side effects of ACA on retirement to be of concern to policymakers.  
A goal of this paper is to help to fill the gap in our understanding of the effects of the 
Affordable Care Act (ACA) on retirement. Our aim is to bridge the contradictory findings 
between the retiree health literature and the recent analysis of the ACA’s retirement effects.  
We focus on three major groups of employed individuals, categorized by their employer-
provided health insurance coverage before the adoption of ACA. A first group consists of 
individuals with employer-provided health insurance when working, but with no employer 
provided retiree health insurance to cover them should they retire before age 65. This group is 
subject to an incentive from ACA that is similar to the incentive created by retiree health 
insurance. ACA would not induce as large a change in the marginal incentive to retire for two 
                                                          
4 As Levy et al. (2015) point out; the problems with the start-up of the exchanges may have 
adversely affected perceptions as to the availability of alternatives to employer-provided 
insurance. The short time frame creates other reasons for the absence of an observed effect. 
There has been little time for those very near retirement age to reoptimize. For example, an 
individual may need to accumulate additional wealth required to fund an earlier retirement. It 
might also be that the effects of ACA on retirement will not be visible until the near retirement 
age population better understands the change in retirement incentives introduced by ACA.  
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other groups, those whose employers provide health insurance both on the job and in retirement 
and those with no employer-provided health insurance either at work or when retired.  
First, using two cohorts from the Health and Retirement Study, we conduct a difference-
in-difference analysis of the actual effects of ACA on retirement in the short term. This analysis 
uses data from the HRS Mid Boomer cohort to calculate the differences in retirement outcomes 
between those whose retirement incentives are modified by ACA and those whose marginal 
incentives are not affected by ACA. Retirement changes are calculated over the 2010 to 2014 
period. The analysis then compares the changes between the three groups over the period that 
ACA was adopted with the analogous changes over an earlier period when ACA did not affect 
incentives. Note that our approach, comparing the differences in outcomes among these three 
groups between two periods, differs from and is somewhat complementary to the approach taken 
by Levy, Buchmueller, and Nikpay (2015). 
In view of the possibility that it is too early to find ACA’s effects on actual retirements, 
our second step is to extend the time period for measuring retirement. We do this by considering 
changes in respondent reports of their expected retirement and Social Security claiming dates. 
The changes in expectations are calculated for each of the coverage groups over the 2010 to 2014 
period for the Mid Boomers, and over the comparable age span for Early Boomers. Since many 
expect to retire after 2014, while the 2010-2014 period is used to observe actual changes in 
retirements, using the change in retirement expectations as the dependent variable may allow 
time for individuals to make required changes in saving and other related behavior that are not 
possible in the short run.  
Our third step is to project the potential effects of ACA over an even longer period. For 
this exercise, we use a structural model of retirement. The model was previously estimated to 
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explain the retirement behavior observed for members of the original HRS cohort. Our model 
includes the role that health insurance plays in buffering against small-probability, catastrophic 
health events that may create very large declines in assets and consumption.  
To simulate the effects of ACA on retirements, we introduce ACA into the budget 
constraint facing each individual. This procedure allows us to simulate the effects of ACA in the 
long run, i.e., the full adjustments in retirement that might be observed for those who entered the 
labor market with ACA already in place. It also allows us to simulate adjustments in outcomes 
over the short and intermediate terms. We do this by introducing ACA at an older age and 
allowing respondents to reoptimize their behavior in view of the unexpected change in the law. 
Thus a major advantage of the structural approach is that it allows us to compare the effects of 
ACA on retirement in the short, intermediate, and long run. 
We are aware of an important potential pitfall in analyzing the relation of retiree health 
insurance to retirement. Availability of employer-provided health insurance is correlated with 
coverage by a defined benefit pension. Previous analyses have at times confounded the effects of 
retiree health insurance with those of DB pensions. To avoid this pitfall, after we explore the 
retiree health insurance — pension relation in descriptive data, we standardize for the influence 
of correlated pension incentives on retirement in a multivariate, and then in a structural setting. 
This is designed to eliminate any specification error that would otherwise result from failing to 
standardize for the covariance between employer-provided health insurance and incentives from 
pensions.  
In Section II, we estimate the size of the groups classified by their health insurance 
coverage in 2010. We use the panel feature of the HRS to document the changes in employer-
provided health insurance at work and in retirement between 2010, before ACA, and 2014, after 
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ACA was implemented. These descriptive data are followed by tables that include other sources 
of health insurance beside those provided by employers, including health insurance purchased in 
the private market, coverage from a spouse’s employment, and from other sources. After that we 
explore the relation between employer-provided health insurance and two key covariates, 
pension plan coverage and plan type.  
Section III estimates the relation between initial type of health insurance coverage and 
retirements observed between 2010 and 2014, and compares those changes with the changes in 
retirement observed for members of an older cohort over a four-year period involving the same 
initial age span. Section IV examines changes in retirement intentions before versus after 
adoption of the ACA. We focus on changes in intended retirement dates, and on changes in 
intended date of claiming Social Security benefits. Once again we conduct a difference-in-
difference analysis of retirement intentions. This compares differences in retirement intentions 
between members of the younger cohort affected by ACA over a four-year span with differences 
in retirement intentions for members of an older cohort of the same initial age, over a four-year 
span. The difference-in-difference analysis standardizes for any longer term trends, as well as 
changes in actual retirements and in expectations that arise over the period just before retirement 
age. Section V modifies our structural model to project responses to ACA in the long term, as 
well as in the short run and intermediate run. Section VI concludes.  
II. Descriptive Analysis of the Availability of Health Insurance 
This section describes health insurance coverage as reported by respondents. It is based 
on data from the Mid Boomer cohort of the Health and Retirement Study. This includes 
respondents who were born from 1954 through 1959 and were ages 51 to 56 when they first 
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entered the HRS.5 Observations begin in 2010, before ACA affected the availability of health 
insurance. The last observations currently available from the HRS are from 2014.  
IIA. Health Insurance Coverage from Employers 
Table 1 begins with data on insurance from work-related sources only. The sample in 
each year is restricted to those who have a current job in that year. Percentages of observations in 
the indicated year are reported below the counts in each cell. From row 1, column 1 of Table 1, 
1054 respondents in 2010, or 39.3 percent of 2010 respondents who were currently employed, 
had employer-provided health insurance while working on their current job, but did not have 
employer-provided health insurance in retirement. This juxtaposition of health insurance 
availability generates the strongest first order incentive influencing retirement prior to ACA, 
encouraging the individual to postpone retiring. Moving down column 1, 42.7 percent of 
respondents had no employer-provided health insurance either on their current job or in 
retirement. Lack of availability of employer-provided health insurance both before and after 
retirement means that health insurance did not differentially affect the incentive to retire for this 
group. The third group includes 18 percent of employed respondents. In 2010, these individuals 
had employer-provided health insurance whether working or retired.6  
                                                          
5 By limiting the analysis to individuals who were ages 51 to 56 when they entered the HRS, we 
exclude those who entered the HRS before 2010 as a younger or older spouse to an age eligible 
household member. That is, we exclude cases where the spouse, but not the Mid Boomer 
respondent, was 51 to 56 years old at the time of entering the survey. 
6 The relative sizes of each of the three groups are similar for both males and females. When 
the sample is restricted to those who had been on the job for at least 10 years, the fraction with 
health insurance on the job, but no health insurance in retirement, increases slightly. For 
example, in 2010, 42.6 percent of the sample of long-term job holders had health insurance on 
the job, but not in retirement. The group with health insurance both when working and when 
retired increases from 18.0 percent of all employed to 22.2 percent of long-term employed.  
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There are very small differences between years in the proportion falling within each 
health insurance group.7 This can be seen by comparing values across the three columns of Table 
1. Between 2010 and 2014, the fraction of the employed with health insurance on the job and no 
health insurance in retirement decreases from 39.3 percent to 37.6 percent of the employed. The 
fraction with no health insurance either on the job or in retirement decreases from 42.7 percent of 
the employed in 2010 to 42.4 percent in 2014. Lastly, the percentage of employees with health 
insurance both at work and when retired increases from 18.0 to 20.0 percent. 
Table 1: Employer Provided Health Insurance on Current Job and in Retirement in 2010, 
2012 and 2014 (percentages of total are in parentheses) 
 2010 2012 2014 
HI on Job; No HI in Retirement 1,054 
(39.3) 
991 
(38.9) 
865 
(37.6) 
No HI on Job; No HI in Retirement 1,144 
(42.7) 
1,092 
(42.9) 
976 
(42.4) 
HI on Job; HI in Retirement 483 
(18.0) 
462 
(18.2) 
459 
(20.0) 
Total 2,681 2,545 2,300 
*The sample is restricted to Mid Boomers who had a current job and were ages 51 to 56 when 
they first entered the survey. 
 
The main effect of ACA on retirement incentives results from making retiree health 
insurance available to those who leave their firms before age 65. This increased availability 
comes from the private health insurance market and exchanges rather than from the employer. 
Secondary effects would arise if employers changed the relative availability of health insurance 
                                                          
7 Comparing columns 1 and 3 of Table 1, bottom row, between 2010 and 2014, the total 
number respondents to the survey who reported themselves as employed declined 14.2 percent (1 
– 2,300/2,681). The attrition rate for the overall sample of Mid Boomers between 2010 and 2014 
is 17.5 percent (691/3,940). 
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on the job and in retirement.8 There is no evidence of major changes in employer offerings after 
ACA, however. 
The summary statistics in Table 1 do not provide a full picture of the changes 
experienced by those falling in different health insurance groups before ACA. Those in one 
category of health insurance in 2010 frequently are found in another category in 2014.9 While 
the flows into and out of a particular category roughly offset, it would appear from the row and 
column totals of Table 1 that the changes between 2010 and 2014 are relatively small. Similarly, 
the summary statistics in the final column and bottom row of Table 2 do not suggest major 
changes in health insurance status in the aggregate.  
In fact, from the perspective of individuals there is a substantial probability of moving 
from one health insurance category to another, although the probability of having the same 
coverage at work and in retirement in 2014 as in 2010 is substantially greater than 50 percent. 
Consider row 1 of Table 2. In 2010, before the ACA was implemented, 40.9 percent of 
respondents were covered by health insurance on their current job, but not in retirement. Looking 
across row 1, by 2014, 66.2 percent of those individuals (522/789) still had health insurance on 
their current job, but not in retirement. From row 1, column 2, however, by 2014, 13.6 percent 
(107/789) had lost health insurance on their current job and still had no health insurance in 
                                                          
8 There also may be other second order effects of ACA. Employers might, for example, 
change the subsidies for employee versus retiree health insurance, either modifying required 
contributions or deductibles and copays. Retirement incentives would also be changed if 
employers created or modified any compensating wage differentials. HRS does not provide 
information on the extent of employer subsidization of health insurance. Nor has ACA been in 
effect long enough to reliably identify any changes in compensating wage differentials. 
9 For this analysis, Table 2 is restricted to Mid Boomers who responded to the HRS in 2010 
and 2014, and who held a job in those years. For completeness, we also include a small category 
consisting of those who report having health insurance in retirement, but not on the current job. 
Presumably their coverage must have come from a previous employer, or it may simply be the 
result of reporting error. 
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retirement. In contrast, among those with health insurance on their current job in 2010 but not in 
retirement, by 2014 19.8 percent (156/789) had maintained their insurance on their current job, 
while also gaining retiree health insurance. 
From row 2 of Table 2, which begins with the 40.3 percent of respondents in 2010 who 
had no health insurance either on the job or in retirement, we see that 16.6 percent (129/777) 
gained health insurance on the job by 2014. An additional 6.9 percent (54/777) of those with no 
insurance in 2010 gained health insurance both while employed in their 2014 job and also when 
they retired.  
Lastly, although 54.5 percent (188/345) of those who had both current and retiree health 
insurance in 2010 were also insured in 2014, 32.8 percent (113/345) lost their retiree benefits, 
although they maintained insurance on their current job, while by 2014, 11.0 percent (38/345) no 
longer had either current or retiree health insurance.  
Table 2: Number of Respondents by Health Insurance Coverage on Current Job and in 
Retirement, 2010 to 2014 (percentages of total are in parentheses) 
 2014 
2010 HI Cur Job; 
No HI Ret. 
No HI Cur 
Job; No HI 
Ret 
HI Cur Job; 
HI Ret 
No HI Cur 
Job; HI Ret 
Row Total  
HI Cur Job; 
No HI Ret. 
522 
(66.2) 
107 
(13.6) 
156 
(19.8) 
4 
(.005) 
789 
(40.9) 
No HI Cur 
Job; No HI 
Ret 
129 
(16.6) 
593 
(76.3) 
 
54 
(6.9) 
1 
(.001) 
777 
(40.3) 
HI Cur Job; 
HI Ret 
113 
(32.8) 
38 
(11.0) 
188 
(54.5) 
6 
(1.7) 
345 
(17.9) 
No HI Cur 
Job; HI Ret 
2 
(11.1) 
5 
(27.8) 
1 
(5.6) 
10 
(55.6) 
18 
(0.1) 
Column 
Total 
766 
(39.7) 
743 
(38.5) 
399 
(20.7) 
21 
(1.1) 
1929 
(100) 
* Sample includes those respondents in 2010 and 2014 who had a current job in each of those 
years. 
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IIB. Health Insurance Coverage from All Sources 
The goal of ACA is to increase health insurance coverage, whether that coverage is 
through the employer or from other sources. The shares of respondents with each source of 
employer provided coverage in 2010 are reported in the last column of Table 3. Shares of 
employed respondents by source of coverage in 2014 are reported in the bottom row. The cells in 
the table trace the changes in sources of coverage between 2010 and 2014, before and after ACA. 
For purposes of comparison, Appendix Table 1 reports the same flows for the Early Boomer 
cohort between 2004 and 2008, when they fell in the same age span as the Mid Boomers, but 
were unaffected by the ACA. 
Health insurance coverage is considerably higher when one considers sources beyond 
own current employer. Looking down the last column of Table 3, these other sources of coverage 
increase the health insurance coverage rate from 56 percent of employed individuals based on 
insurance from own employer up to 81 percent. (In 2004 the Early Boomer cohort shows an 
analogous increase from considering other sources of health insurance from 59 percent to 86 
percent.) Aside from own employment, in 2010 the spouse’s employer (13 percent), private 
insurance (4 percent) and insurance through self-employment (3 percent) are the three most 
important sources of coverage.10 The results in Appendix Table 1 for Early Boomers in 2004  
are similar. 
From row 9, column 12, when health insurance coverage from private insurance, 
Medicare, Medicaid, from military service, and from other sources are included, 19 percent of 
the continuously employed had no health insurance in 2010. (In 2004, 14 percent were   
                                                          
10 Disaggregating the Mid Boomer statistics by gender, 11.7 percent of males and 13.5 percent of 
females are covered via their spouse’s health insurance. 
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uninsured.) After ACA, from row 10, column 11, of Table 3, the group with no insurance had 
fallen to 15 percent. Thus between 2010 and 2014, the share of currently employed individuals 
without health insurance coverage had fallen by about 4 percentage points. (Between 2004 and 
2008, there was a 1 percentage point decline in the share of the employed who were uninsured.) 
Among 1,080 respondents who had coverage from a current employer in 2010, 87 percent (941) 
had insurance from a current employer four years later. Of the remainder, 5.2 percent (56/1,080) 
ended up with no health insurance; 2.8 percent (30/1080) were newly insured through a spouse, 
and 2.4 percent (26/1,080) had purchased private insurance.  
Of 373 individuals who had no insurance in 2010, just over half (50.9 percent = 190/373) 
still had no insurance by 2014; 23.1 percent (86/373) gained insurance from a current employer; 
11.8 percent (44/373) secured private insurance; and 7.5 percent (28/373) gained coverage  
from Medicaid. The transitions observed between 2004 and 2008, before the advent of ACA, 
were similar. 
Not shown in Table 3, the percentage of the sample with retiree health insurance from 
their own current employer, a previous employer, or a spouse’s employer, increased from 19.2 
percent in 2010 to 22.5 percent 2014.  
There are three lessons to take away from these data. The first is that the transitions from 
the period before to after ACA are not very different from the comparable transitions observed 
for an older cohort over the same age span. The second lesson is a caveat about our 
methodology. We will attempt to measure the effects of ACA on retirement incentives by 
focusing on the group that, before ACA, had employer-provided health insurance on the job, but 
not in retirement. We assume they gain coverage in retirement from ACA that they otherwise 
would not have had, so their incentive to keep on working is reduced. But as Table 3 
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demonstrates, some of them would have secured health insurance in retirement from the other 
sources listed in that table. For those respondents, we will overstate the effects of ACA on their 
retirement incentives. Members of other groups would also have experienced a change in their 
insurance status before reaching retirement age. For some, ACA would have a greater effect on 
their retirement incentives than we are supposing. The third lesson is that others would have 
secured health insurance coverage outside of their own employment. This means that our attempt 
to identify the affected group by focusing only on insurance from the employer tells only part of 
the story. This approximation should be borne in mind when interpreting our later results.  
II C. Health Insurance Coverage and Pensions 
To understand the relationship between retirement and retiree health insurance, as 
Gustman and Steinmeier (1994) strongly suggests, one must eliminate the effects of any 
covariation with incentives created by defined benefit pensions. There is a very close relationship 
between coverage by a defined benefit pension and the availability of retiree health insurance. 
Omitting the incentive created by an early retirement spike due to a defined benefit pension from 
a retirement analysis invites specification error. The effect on retirement of the omitted pension 
incentive, which varies with the terms of the pension benefit formula, as well as the work history 
of the covered individual, will be attributed to retiree health insurance. 
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Table 3: Number of Employed Respondents by the Source of Insurance in 2010 and 2014 
 2014 
2010 Current 
Employer 
 
 
 
1 
Pre-
vious 
Employ
er 
 
2 
Self 
Emp-
loyed 
Bus-
iness 
3 
Spouse 
Employer 
– current 
or former 
 
4 
Private 
Insurance 
Purchase 
 
 
5 
Medicare 
(disability
?) 
 
 
6 
Medi-
caid 
 
 
 
7 
Military 
 
 
 
 
8 
With 
Gov. 
Sub-
sidy 
 
9* 
Purchas-
ed on 
Gov. Ex-
change 
10* 
No 
insur-
ance 
 
 
11 
Row 
Total 
 
 
 
12 
1-Current Employer 
 
941 12 3 30 26 3 3 6 4 5 56 1080 
56% 
2-Previous 
Employer 
7 12 1 2 2 0 0 1 1 1 1 26 
1% 
3-Self Employed 
Business 
4 0 31 1 6 0 1 1 0 0 10 54 
3% 
4-Spouse Employer 
– current or former 
51 0 5 167 10 1 2 2 0 1 11 249 
13% 
5-Private Insurance 
Purchase (includes 
AARP and others) 
14 0 7 6 27 1 5 0 0 0 11 71 
4% 
6-Medicare 
(disability?) 
0 0 0 1 1 9 0 0 2 2 2 13 
1% 
7-Medicaid 
 
8 0 0 1 1 1 15 1 0 0 10 37 
2% 
8- Military 
 
1 0 0 0 2 0 0 21 0 0 2 26 
1% 
9-No insurance 
 
86 0 6 14 44 2 28 3 9 10 190 373 
19% 
10-Column Total 1,112 
58% 
24 
1% 
53 
3% 
222 
12% 
119 
6% 
17 
1% 
54 
3% 
35 
2% 
16 
1% 
19 
1% 
293 
15% 
1929 
100% 
* This sample is constrained to include those who were currently employed in 2010 and in 2014. Columns 9 and 10 are not mutually 
exclusive. These are subsets of private insurance purchase. 
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Descriptive data on the relation between pension coverage and the availability of 
employer provided retiree health insurance, and type of pension plan and the availability of 
employer provided retiree health insurance, are reported in Table 4. From the bottom row, 
columns 1 and 2, we see that 45.2 (1,212/2,681) percent of the sample has no pension from their 
current job.  
Table 4: Pension Plan Coverage and Plan Type for Pension from Current Job by Health 
Insurance Coverage, Mid Boomers 2010, Number of Observations 
 
Total No Pens DB only DC only Both 
HI job; No HI ret 1,054 266 191 386 205 
No HI job; No HI 
ret 1,144 885 63 154 37 
HI job; HI ret 483 61 105 179 137 
Total 2,681 1,212 359 719 379 
 
Turn to Table 5, which reports the column percentages of Table 4. From column 2, row 3, 
we see that only 5 percent of those with no pension on their current job have health insurance in 
retirement. From Table 5, row 2, column 2, almost three fourths (73 percent) of those who do not 
have a pension on their current job also do not have either health insurance on that job or in 
retirement. Just over one-fifth of those without a pension (21.9 percent) has health insurance on 
the job, but does not have retiree health insurance.  
Looking across row 1 of Table 5, whatever the pension plan type, 53 to 54 percent of 
those with a pension have health insurance on the job, but do not have retiree health insurance. 
The next most likely outcome for those with a pension is to have both health insurance on the job 
and retiree health insurance. That probability is highest for those with both a DB and DC pension 
at 36.1 percent. Of those with a DB plan only, 29.2 percent have employer-provided insurance 
both on the job and in retirement. In addition, 24.9 percent of those with a DC plan only have 
health insurance both when working and into retirement. Roughly a fifth of those with a DB only 
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or DC plan only have no health insurance either when working or retired (17.5 percent and 21.4 
percent respectively). Those who have both DB and DC pensions have only a 9.8 percent chance 
of having no health insurance both when working and when retired. 
Table 5: Type of Health Insurance Coverage Conditional on Plan Type for Pensions from 
Current Job, Mid Boomers, 2010 
 Total No Pens DB only DC only Both 
HI job; No HI 
ret 39.3 21.9 53.2 53.7 54.1 
No HI job; No 
HI ret 42.7 73.0 17.5 21.4 9.8 
HI job; HI ret 18.0 5.0 29.2 24.9 36.1 
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 
*Column percentages from Table 4. 
Table 6 reports the type of pension conditional on retiree health insurance coverage on 
the current job and/or retiree health insurance. From the bottom row, the percentages of the 
currently employed with a DB pension only, a DC pension only, and both types, are 13.4, 26.8 
and 14.1 percent respectively. (Similar results are found when plan type is computed for 
pensions from any job, not just the current job.) In Table 6, row 3, we see that half of those with 
retiree health insurance have a DB plan only, or both a DB and a DC plan on their current job 
(21.7 + 28.4). Yet of the total sample, only 27.5 percent have a DB plan, whether alone or in 
combination with a DC plan. Given the overwhelming evidence that DB pension incentives 
strongly influence retirement outcomes, this confirms the importance of controlling for the 
relationship between retiree health insurance and coverage by a defined benefit plan in 
retirement equations. 
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Table 6: Type of Pension Conditional on Type of Health Insurance Coverage from Current 
Job, Mid Boomers, 2010 
 Total No Pens DB only DC only Both 
HI job; No HI 
ret 100 25.2 18.1 36.6 19.4 
No HI job; No 
HI ret 100 77.4 5.5 13.5 3.2 
HI job; HI ret 100 12.6 21.7 37.1 28.4 
Total 100 45.2 13.4 26.8 14.1 
*Row percentages from Table 4. 
Instead of sorting individuals based on type of pension, Tables 7, 8, and 9 include only 
those who are covered by a pension on their current job and sort them by pension wealth quartile. 
Table 7 contains the raw numbers in each cell, while Tables 8 and 9 report relevant row and 
column percentages. 
Table 7: Number of Employed Respondents by Type of Health Insurance Coverage and 
Pension Plan Wealth Quartile, Mid Boomers with Pension Wealth for Pensions from 
Current Job, 2010 
 
Total 0-25 percent 25-50 percent 50-75 percent 
75-100 
percent 
HI job; No HI 
ret 785 201 213 197 174 
No HI job; No 
HI ret 261 109 70 44 38 
HI job; HI ret 424 98 82 131 113 
Total 1470 408 365 372 325 
 
From Tables 7, row 3, we see that as pension wealth increases, so does the share of 
respondents who have both health insurance on the job and health insurance in retirement. From 
row 2 of Table 7, the number with no health insurance either on the job or in retirement declines 
with pension wealth.  
Table 8 reports the column percentages from Table 7. Looking across row 3, the 
percentage with health insurance on the job and in retirement rises from 24.1 percent of those in 
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the lowest pension wealth category (column 2, row 3) to 34.8 percent of those in the highest 
pension wealth category (column 5, row 3). 
Table 8: Type of Health Insurance Coverage Conditional on Plan Wealth Quartile, Mid 
Boomers with Pension Wealth from Current Job, 2010  
  Total 0-25 percent 25-50 percent 50-75 percent 75-100 percent 
HI job; No HI ret 53.3 49.1 58.4 52.8 53.5 
No HI job; No HI 
ret 
17.7 26.7 19.2 11.8 11.7 
HI job; HI ret 28.8 24.1 22.5 35.3 34.8 
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 
*Column percentages of Table 7.  
Table 9 reports the row percentages from Table 7. Looking across row 3, we see the share 
of those with health insurance at work and in retirement that comes from each pension wealth 
category. From column 4, row 3, 30.9 percent of those with retiree health insurance come from 
the third quartile of respondents ranked by pension wealth. Those falling in the highest pension 
wealth quartile account for a smaller share of those with retiree health insurance at 26.7 percent. 
Table 9: Level of Plan Wealth Quartile Conditional on Type of Health Insurance Coverage, 
Mid Boomers with Pension Wealth from Current Job, 2010 
 
Total 0-25 percent 25-50 percent 50-75 percent 
75-100 
percent 
HI job; No HI 
ret 100.0 25.6 27.1 25.1 22.2 
No HI job; No 
HI ret 100.0 41.8 26.8 16.9 14.6 
HI job; HI ret 100.0 23.1 19.3 30.9 26.7 
Total 100.0 27.8 24.8 25.3 22.1 
*Row percentages of Table 7. 
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III. Health Insurance Coverage and Actual Retirement Age 
Levy, Buchmueller, and Nikpay (2015) studied the effects of ACA on actual retirements 
by relating the probability of retirement to the availability of ACA in the indicated state. We 
begin with a simple relation between observed retirements (an indication in the CPS-type labor 
market status question in the HRS that the individual was retired in 2014 after having reported a 
job in 2010) and the type of health insurance held.  
Table 10 reports retirement rates over a four-year period for the three groups of 
employed, categorized by their health insurance coverage in the base period. Retirements for 
those in the Mid Boomer cohort are reported in column 1. Retirements by members of the Early 
Boomer cohort are in column 2. Differences in retirement rates between cohorts are reported in 
column 3. The row headings differentiate the three groups according to whether they have 
employer-provided health insurance while working and whether they have retiree health 
insurance.  
If the results in Table 10 were produced by a natural experiment, the differences in 
column 3 would indicate the effect of ACA on retirement. The expectation would be that 
retirement rates would increase by more for those in row 1 of the table since ACA reduces their 
marginal incentive to stay at work, while it does not affect marginal incentives for members of 
other groups.  
There are two takeaways from Table 10, neither of which is very helpful in isolating the 
relation between ACA and retirement. First, looking down column 1, retirement is higher in the 
Mid Boomer cohort for those with health insurance both on the job and in retirement (row 3, 7.6 
percent) than it is for those with health insurance on the job but not in retirement (row 1, 3.6 
percent). But retirements are even lower for those with no health insurance on the job or in 
retirement (row 2, 2.7 percent). A similar relation is found for the Early Boomer cohort.  
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The second take away is from column 3. Here we compare changes in retirement over the 
four-year age span between cohorts. This comparison suggests that the absolute reduction in 
retirement was greater over the period ACA was phased in for those who had employer provided 
health insurance both on the job and in retirement than it was for members of the other two 
health insurance groups. The fact that retirements were reduced for all three groups probably 
reflects the effects of the Great Recession. In particular, the labor supply response probably 
discouraged early retirements. In contrast, the policies adopted by employers to deal with 
downturn in demand are likely to have encouraged retirements, but these policies probably 
differed among employers offering different health insurance options. The changes in retirements 
observed in column 3 may be expected to reflect the joint effects of ACA and the different 
reactions to the Great Recession. In any case we can find no direct evidence in simple descriptive 
statistics that ACA accelerated retirements. 
Table 10: Percent Who Retired Over Four-Year Period, Mid Boomer and Early Boomer 
Cohorts 
 Percent Mid 
Boomers Who 
Retired Between 
2010 and 2014 
Percent Early 
Boomers Who 
Retired Between 
2004 and 2008 
Difference in 
Percent Between 
Mid Boomers and 
Early Boomers 
HI on Job; No HI in 
Retirement in 2010 
3.6 
 
6.3 -2.7 
No HI on Job; No HI in 
Retirement in 2010 
2.7 
 
4.2 -1.5 
HI on Job; HI in Retirement 
in 2010 
7.6 
 
10.2 -4.2 
Sample is conditioned on having held job in base period. 
 
To further analyze the relation between health insurance type and actual retirement 
between 2010 and 2014, and over the analogous period for an older cohort, Table 11 presents the 
results of a probit analysis. Here we pool the samples from the Early Boomer and Mid Boomer 
20 
 
cohorts and observe their retirement behavior from the year they entered the HRS until four 
years later. The dependent variable is 1 if the individual retired over the four-year period, either 
between 2010 and 2014 for Mid Boomers, or 2004 to 2008 for Early Boomers.  
The probit coefficients reported in column 1 are for dummy explanatory variables 
indicating type of health insurance coverage in the base period, and for interaction variables 
between cohort (Mid Boomer) and indicators of the type of employer-provided health insurance. 
The interaction variables reflect the difference in retirements between the Mid Boomers and the 
Early Boomer cohort. A dummy variable for cohort is also included separately, but the 
coefficient is not reported in Table 11. There are no other covariates in the probit underlying 
column 1.  
Those with health insurance on their current job but not in retirement, and those with 
health insurance both on the job and when retired, are more likely to have retired than those 
without health insurance either at work or should they retire. This result is consistent with the 
descriptive statistics in Table 10. However, neither interaction variable is significant. That is, we 
can find no statistically significant evidence that compared to Early Boomers, Mid Boomers with 
health insurance on the job, but with no retiree health insurance, were more likely to stay in the 
labor market as a result of ACA. 
As seen from the coefficients reported in column 2, when other covariates are added to 
the probit underlying column 1, the findings remain unchanged. These covariates are related to 
demographics, education, health, pension coverage, and unemployment. Thus we find no 
statistically significant evidence that ACA accelerated the relative retirement rates of those who, 
before ACA, had health insurance when working, but did not have retiree health insurance. 
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To be sure, the effects of ACA on retirements may have been obscured by major 
differences in employer behavior between the Early Boomers’ and Mid Boomers’ retirements. It 
might also be that not enough time has passed to see the basic effect of ACA on retirement. In 
view of these possibilities, we turn to alternative approaches to estimating the effects of ACA on 
retirement. 
Table 11. Probit of Retired in 2008/2014 on Health Insurance Dummy Variable in 
2004/2010* 
 Includes Only HI Variables Includes HI Variables and 
Other Covariates 
HI from Current Employer, 
No Retiree HI* 
0.1806 
(.1134) 
0.1397 
(.1233) 
HI on Current Job and in 
Retirement 
0.4380 
(.1181) 
0.3484 
(.1293) 
MBs-HI from Current 
Employer, No Retiree HI* 
-0.0634 
(.1634) 
-0.1372 
(.1720) 
MBs- HI on Current Job 
and in Retirement 
0.0428 
(.1744) 
-0.0209 
(.1825) 
Sample Size 3,939 
*Standard errors are in parentheses. Also included in each probit is a dummy variable 
indicating no health insurance coverage when working, but coverage when retired. That category 
includes only 58 observations. Other covariates included in column 2 measure gender, age, 
education, health, occupation, type of pension coverage, and whether the individual is looking 
for work. 
 
IV. Health Insurance Coverage and Expected Claiming and Retirement Ages 
To set the stage for our analysis of the effects of ACA on retirement in the intermediate 
term, in Table 12 we report the expected ages of claiming Social Security benefits (or the 
expected retirement age – the age at which the individual stops work entirely) from 2010 through 
2014, and relate those dates to health insurance coverage in 2010.11 Consider Table 12, column 
                                                          
11 The sample in Table 12 is conditioned on the respondent having held a job in all three years. It 
includes those who answered “don’t know” or refused to the age of claiming or retirement age 
questions. For those whose claiming age is missing, we use age 62. For those who report a 
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1, row 1, in the top panel. On average respondents with health insurance on the job but not in 
retirement in 2010 expected, as of 2010, to claim benefits at age 65.0. From column 1, row 2, 
respondents with no health insurance either on the job or in retirement expected to claim benefits 
at 64.6. Thus respondents who in 2010 had health insurance on the job, but not in retirement, 
expected to claim their Social Security benefits 0.4 years later than those with no health 
insurance on the job or in retirement. A person with health insurance on the job but not in 
retirement also expected to claim benefits half a year later than someone with health insurance 
both on the job and when retired (65.0 versus 64.5).12  
The relation of type of health insurance to expected retirement age differed somewhat 
from the relation of type of health insurance to claiming age. From the lower panel in Table 12, 
in 2010, those with health insurance on their current job, but no health insurance in retirement, 
expected to retire seven-tenths of a year earlier than those with no health insurance either on the 
job or in retirement (64.5 versus 65.2). They expected to retire 0.4 years after those with health 
insurance both at work and in retirement (64.5 versus 64.1).  
Next, compare results between the two panels in Table 12, beginning with row 1, column 
1, in each panel. Those with health insurance on the job and no health insurance in retirement in 
2010 expected to claim their Social Security benefits at age 65, half a year after they retired. 
Those with no health insurance on the job and no health insurance in retirement expected to 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
claiming age older than 70, we change the claiming age to 70. For those with missing expected 
retirement age, we use the expected claiming age.  Appendix Table 2 reports the claiming and 
retirement ages for the subsample of respondents who did not answer “don’t know” or “refused” 
to the expected age questions. The comparisons among cell values are similar, but not identical, 
to those described in the following paragraphs. 
12 Note that for both the expected age of claiming and of retirement, all medians are age 65 and 
do not differ by health insurance coverage. 
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claim benefits 0.6 years before they retired, while those with health insurance both on the job and 
in retirement expected to retire four-tenths of a year before they claimed their benefits.  
Table 12: Expected Ages of Social Security Benefit Claiming and Retirement, weighted* 
 2010 2012 2014 
Expected Age of Benefit Claiming 
HI on Job; No HI in Retirement in 
2010 
65.0 
 
64.8 
 
65.1 
 
No HI on Job; No HI in Retirement 
in 2010 
64.6 
 
64.6 
 
64.6 
 
HI on Job; HI in Retirement in 
2010 
64.5 
 
65.0 
 
64.8 
 
Expected Age of Retirement 
HI on Job; No HI in Retirement in 
2010 
64.5 65.0 65.2 
No HI on Job; No HI in Retirement 
in 2010 
65.2 65.5 65.4 
HI on Job; HI in Retirement in 
2010 
64.1 64.9 64.9 
*2010 weights. Includes only respondents who held a job in all three years. 
 
Next, consider the statistics relevant to the effects of ACA on retirement expectations. 
Compare the expected ages of claiming or retirement in 2010 with the expected ages in 2014. 
There was little change in the expected age of Social Security benefit claiming. The movement in 
the expected age of retirement is in the opposite direction of what was expected from changes in 
ACA. If no other influences were operating except for the change in ACA, our expectation is that 
the expected age of claiming and of retirement should decline for those who had health insurance 
on the job, but not in retirement. Instead, from the lower panel, first row, between 2010 and 
2014, the expected age of retirement increased by seven-tenths of a year for those who had 
health insurance when working, but no retiree health insurance.  
To be sure, the increase in retirement age in all categories may reflect an adjustment to 
capital losses and job losses suffered during the Great Recession. However, the increase in 
expected retirement age for those with health insurance at work but not in retirement was larger 
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than the increase observed for those who had no employer-provided health insurance from their 
employer while working or in retirement.   
Clearly the descriptive statistics on changes in expected retirement age conditional on 
initial health insurance coverage are not sufficient to test the underlying effects of health 
insurance availability on retirement. There are many considerations beyond the availability of 
health insurance that drive the claiming and retirement decisions. If these are systematically 
related to the availability of health insurance on the job and/or in retirement in 2010, we will not 
observe the expected relationship between health insurance and retirement in simple descriptive 
statistics. To isolate the effects of health insurance availability at work and in retirement on 
retirement outcomes, it will be necessary to take account of the role of pensions and other 
covariates that are correlated with the availability of health insurance and are also correlated with 
retirement outcomes. Accordingly, we turn to multivariate regressions of changes in expected 
retirement age on initial health insurance coverage. 
The sample underlying Table 13 includes members of both the Early and Mid Boomer 
cohorts. It is restricted to those who reported a claiming or retirement age in the initial and final 
year, either 2004 and 2008 for the Early Boomers, or 2010 and 2014 for the Mid Boomers. To be 
included, the respondents could not have answered “don’t know” or “refuse” when asked about 
their expectation. Table 13 is also restricted to respondents who, in the initial year they were in 
the survey, reported they expected to claim benefits or retire at ages 65 or younger. The first two 
columns in Table 13 report results for regressions with the claiming age as the dependent 
variable. The next two columns report results where expected retirement age is the dependent 
variable.  
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In all cases, the key independent variable is the coefficient reported in row 3, the 
coefficient on a dummy variable indicating that the individual had health insurance at work but 
not in retirement, interacted with an indicator that he or she was a member of the Mid Boomer 
cohort. For purposes of difference in difference analysis, other health insurance dummy variables 
in all regressions include an indicator of coverage on the job but not in retirement, an indicator of 
coverage both on the job and in retirement, and an interaction between coverage on the job and 
in retirement with an indicator the individual is from the Mid Boomer cohort. Those with no 
health insurance while employed and with no retiree health insurance fall within the excluded 
category. The multiple regressions in columns 2 and 4 also include variables measuring gender, 
age; a series of dummy variables measuring schooling, education, health, occupation; and type of 
pension coverage. 
The fits for all regressions are very poor. The coefficients reported in row 3, columns 3 
and 4 are in the wrong direction, suggesting that compared to those with no health insurance on 
the job or in retirement, ACA would increase the expected retirement date for those with health 
insurance on the job but not in retirement. This small effect is not statistically significant, 
however. The coefficients in the regressions for expected claiming age are very near zero and 
also are not statistically significant. 
The bottom line is that there is no statistically significant evidence that ACA has affected 
retirement intentions.  
Once again, it is possible that too short a time has passed for ACA to have affected 
retirement expectations, especially since many in the sample would have been a number of years 
away from retirement even in 2014. Reoptimization may take time, and not enough time may 
have passed for plans to have been fully readjusted. 
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Table 13. Change in Expected Dates of Claiming and Retirement for Early and Mid 
Boomers 
(Sample restricted to those who reported expected claiming or retirement age of 65 or younger.) 
 Dependent Variable: Change in 
Expected Claiming Date* 
Dependent Variable: Change in 
Expected Retirement Date* 
Includes Only 
HI Variables 
Includes HI and 
Other 
Covariates 
Includes Only 
HI Variables 
Includes HI and 
Other 
Covariates 
HI from Current 
Employer, No 
Retiree HI** 
0.144 
(.61) 
0.088 
(.37) 
-0.790 
(2.14) 
-0.617 
(1.64) 
HI on Current Job 
and in 
Retirement** 
0.221 
(.81) 
0.124 
(.44) 
-0.933 
(2.18) 
-0.796 
(1.82) 
MBs-HI from 
Current 
Employer, No 
Retiree HI** 
-0.115 
(.37) 
-0.150 
(.48) 
0.614 
(1.28) 
0.536 
(1.10) 
MBs- HI on 
Current Job and 
in Retirement** 
0.181 
(.50) 
0.182 
(.50) 
1.150 
(2.01) 
1.184 
(2.05) 
R square 0.0091 0.0267 0.0055 0.0196 
Sample Size 1,344 
 t values are in parentheses. 
*Covariates include variables measuring gender, age, a series of dummy variables measuring 
schooling, education, health, occupation and type of pension coverage. 
**The omitted category is no health insurance on the current job and no retiree health 
insurance. 
 
It is also possible that the new incentives are not yet fully understood. Learning may take 
time, or the time period may be too short to allow other adjustments, such as the additional 
saving required if retirement is to be accelerated. Or as the dynamics of health insurance 
coverage examined in Section II suggest, the specification of the expected retirement date 
equation may be too simple. When we allow for other sources of health insurance coverage, type 
of employer-provided health insurance in 2010 may be an imperfect measure of the incentive 
facing some individuals. This error in measurement may obscure a true effect of ACA on 
retirement. 
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To further investigate the reasons for this finding in the intermediate term, we now turn to 
an analysis of a structural model that has been useful in explaining various discontinuities in the 
retirement hazard, and the relation of nonlinear retirement incentives to retirement outcomes. 
IV. A Simulation Analysis Based on a Structural Model 
Our structural analysis simulates the effects of the Affordable Care Act on retirement. 
The simulations are based on a model we developed under a grant from the National Institute on 
Aging (Gustman and Steinmeier, 2016). The model is dynamic. Life expectancy and health are 
stochastic.  
There is considerable heterogeneity built into the utility function. Time preference and 
preference for leisure over work differ among individuals. Although time preference varies 
among individuals, time preference is assumed to be constant over time for any individual. 
Leisure preferences can change after retirement, possibly inducing some individuals to return to 
work after an initial period of retirement. 
The budget equation includes earnings in full- and part-time employment, detailed 
specification of formulas governing employer-provided pension plans, Social Security benefit 
rules, health insurance and health expenditures, and spouse’s income. Because the analysis 
explicitly models the incentives from defined benefit pensions, it avoids a fundamental mistake 
of studies that focus on retiree health insurance, but ignore or mismeasure the accrual profiles of 
each individual’s DB pension. Typically such studies attribute the (omitted) effects of DB 
pensions on retirement to retiree health insurance.  
An important simplification in this model concerns the relation between Social Security 
benefit claiming and retirement. Here we impose the assumption that Social Security benefits are 
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claimed as soon as possible. For a study that allows the claiming date to vary and also allows the 
retirement date to differ from the claiming date, see Gustman and Steinmeier (2015). 
A point of emphasis is the relationship between detailed health outcomes, health risks, 
wealth, and retirement. The health section of the model includes several individual proclivities, 
such as smoking, drinking, and obesity, as well as the effects of several medical conditions, such 
as diabetes, heart problems, and lung problems. These help to determine the health status of an 
individual, which can change over time. The health status, in conjunction with the individual’s 
insurance status, determines the distribution of out-of-pocket health costs.  
Within this framework, individuals make labor force choices and savings choices to 
maximize expected utility over time. Maximization of utility subject to the budget constraint 
over the lifecycle governs the retirement decision and the decision to increase work effort once 
retired.  
The estimated effects of ACA are only approximated. We begin the simulation by 
modifying the budget constraint to reflect the situation just before the adoption of ACA. We then 
simulate the effects of the changing availability of health insurance due to ACA by assuming full 
subsidization of health insurance expenditures through ACA. We then compare outcomes before 
and after ACA, where the opportunity set is gleaned from our descriptive analysis, and the 
changes fostered by the ACA are modeled both in the short term and in the long term. Note that 
this approximation will exaggerate the reduction in the work incentive for higher-income 
individuals who are not eligible for a subsidy under ACA while employed. It will also exaggerate 
the reduction in work incentives if ACA is inferior to employer-provided health insurance. 
Despite the effects of this assumption, we will find only a small effect of ACA on retirement. 
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The model was estimated for individuals in the original Health and Retirement Study 
cohort, ages 51 to 61 in 1992. These individuals are now in their 70s and 80s, well past 
retirement age. To make the simulations more relevant to individuals currently on the cusp of 
retirement, several changes have been made to the budget sets for the individuals in the sample. 
First, the full retirement age for Social Security has been set to 66. For most of the individuals in 
the original HRS cohort the full retirement age was 65, but for individuals currently retiring it is 
66. For the same reason, the value of the delayed retirement credit has been adjusted to 8 percent 
for the entire sample; it was considerably less for most of the members of the original HRS 
cohort. Thirdly, the earnings test has been eliminated for individuals above the full retirement 
age, reflecting a change in the law in 2001. Finally, for individuals who had only a defined 
benefit pension, 43 percent of them were randomly reassigned to have a defined contribution 
pension. This roughly reflects the change in the pension environment between the original HRS 
cohort and the more recent Early and Mid Boomer cohorts who are currently in the age range 
where they are making retirement decisions. 
The results of the base simulation, which omit the effects of the Affordable Care Act, are 
shown in Tables 14 through 16. The last two columns of Table 14 give the simulated percentages 
of individuals who are retired from full-time work and who are fully retired, by age. The first 
two columns at the top part of the table give the increase in the percentages of individuals in the 
associated retirement state. For instance, at age 61, 48.6 percent of the individuals are simulated 
to be retired from full-time work, and at age 62, 64.7 percent are simulated to be retired. The 
difference, 16.1 percent, is the net increase in the number of individuals retired from full-time 
work. It is the net flow of individuals who are newly retired from full-time work less the 
individuals who were not working full-time at age 61 but have returned to full-time work at age 
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62. The bottom of the table indicates the hazard rates for retiring at the indicate ages. As 
expected, the hazard rate has a sharp peak at age 62, the Social Security early entitlement age, 
and a secondary peak at age 65, the Medicare eligibility age. 
Table 15 breaks down the percentage of individuals working full-time, part-time, and not 
working at all by lifetime income status. To do so, we calculated the potential lifetime income 
from the Social Security records and divided the sample roughly into thirds. Higher incomes 
seem to be associated with slightly higher retirement rates from full-time work, but the major 
differences appear when we look at part-time work and full retirement. The lower income groups 
are simulated to have much higher rates of part-time work, probably because the wage penalty 
for part-time work versus full-time work is not nearly as severe for lower-wage workers. 
Conversely, higher-income individuals are much less likely to be in part-time work, implying 
that they have a much greater probability of moving from full-time work to full retirement. 
Table 16 is similar to Table 15, except that here the breakdown is by current health status 
rather than lifetime income group. Health status is derived from a combination of mobility 
limitations, pain levels, activity of daily living (ADL) limitations, and self-assessed overall 
health. “Fair” health is generally associated with one or two mobility limitations, while “poor” 
health is associated with several mobility limitations but none or one ADL limitation. “Terrible” 
health is associated with multiple ADL limitations. As expected, the worse the health status, the 
lower is the percentage of full-time work and the higher is the percentage of full retirement. The 
difference between the “good” and “fair” health states is not as dramatic as the difference 
between “fair” and “poor” health, and even more so, between “poor” and “terrible” health. 
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Table 14: Retirement Percentages in Base Line Simulation 
 
Percentage Retiring at Indicated Age Percentage Retired at Indicated Age 
Age 
Retirement from Full-
Time Work 
Full 
Retirement 
Retirement from Full-
Time Work 
Full 
Retirement 
54 2.7 1.9 20.7 15.5 
55 3.3 2.8 24 18.3 
56 3.1 2.5 27.1 20.8 
57 3.7 2.9 30.8 23.7 
58 4 3.5 34.8 27.2 
59 4.1 3.9 39 31.1 
60 5.4 4.6 44.3 35.7 
61 4.2 3.6 48.6 39.4 
62 16.1 10.3 64.7 49.7 
63 1.8 1.2 66.5 50.9 
64 5.8 5.3 72.3 56.2 
65 5.2 4.8 77.5 61 
66 2.4 2.6 79.8 63.6 
67 4.3 4.4 84.2 68 
 Retirement Hazards at Indicated Age 
54 3.3 2.2 
  55 4.2 3.3 
  56 4.1 3.1 
  57 5.1 3.7 
  58 5.8 4.6 
  59 6.3 5.4 
  60 8.9 6.7 
  61 7.5 5.6 
  62 31.3 17 
  63 5.1 2.4 
  64 17.3 10.8 
  65 18.8 11 
  66 10.7 6.7 
  67 21.3 12.1 
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Table 15: Percentage in Each Retirement Status by Income Group in the Base Simulation 
 
Income Group 
Age Low Middle High Low Middle High 
 
Full-Time Work Part-Time Work 
54 77.9 80.3 79.5 6.5 5.1 4.2 
55 76.4 75.6 76 6.9 5.8 4.8 
56 73.1 73 72.5 7.2 6.5 5.4 
57 70.5 68.6 68.4 7.9 7.3 6.4 
58 67.1 64.2 64.4 8.4 7.9 6.6 
59 64.3 60.1 59.1 8.4 8.1 7 
60 59.8 54.7 52.9 9.2 9.2 7.5 
61 57.2 50.4 47.7 9.6 9.9 8.2 
62 31.1 35.9 38.8 26.3 11.6 8.1 
63 28.5 35.3 36.6 26.8 11.9 9.1 
64 23.9 29 30 26.8 13 9.6 
65 19.4 23.3 24.8 27 13.8 9.8 
66 19.1 21.1 20.3 25.2 14 10.7 
67 14.7 16.4 16.3 25.3 14 10.6 
 
Full Retirement 
   54 15.6 14.6 16.3 
   55 16.7 18.6 19.2 
   56 19.7 20.5 22.1 
   57 21.6 24.1 25.2 
   58 24.5 27.9 29 
   59 27.3 31.8 33.9 
   60 31 36.1 39.6 
   61 33.2 39.7 44.1 
   62 42.6 52.5 53.1 
   63 44.7 52.8 54.3 
   64 49.3 58 60.4 
   65 53.6 62.9 65.4 
   66 55.7 64.9 69 
   67 60 69.6 73.1 
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Table 16: Percentage in Each Retirement Status by Health Group in the Base Simulation 
 
Health Status 
Age Good Fair Poor Terrible Good Fair Poor Terrible 
 
Percent Working Full-Time Percent Working Part-Time 
54 84.1 81.2 65.7 43.5 4.5 5.1 7.3 8.6 
55 81.4 78.2 60.7 37.2 5.1 5.6 7.8 8.8 
56 78.8 75.4 57 32.5 5.7 6.2 8 8.9 
57 75.5 72 52.2 27.5 6.6 7 8.9 9.4 
58 72 68.1 47.6 22.9 7 7.5 9.2 9.8 
59 68.4 64.1 42.5 18.3 7.2 7.8 9.5 9.8 
60 63.4 59 36.4 13.6 8 8.5 10.2 10.1 
61 59.5 55 31.9 10.4 8.6 9.1 10.8 10.6 
62 43.4 37.6 16.7 4.1 14.9 16 14.9 9.1 
63 41.8 35.9 15.1 3.2 15.7 16.8 15.3 8.7 
64 35.5 30 11.2 2.1 16.4 17.5 14.8 7.7 
65 29.5 24.6 8.1 1.5 17.3 18.1 14.2 6.8 
66 26.7 22.6 6.5 0.9 17.1 17.8 14.5 7.3 
67 21.6 17.8 4.5 0.6 17.4 18 13.8 6.6 
 
Percent Completely Retired 
    54 11.4 13.7 27 47.9 
    55 13.5 16.2 31.5 54 
    56 15.5 18.4 35 58.6 
    57 17.9 21 38.9 63.1 
    58 21 24.4 43.2 67.3 
    59 24.4 28.1 48 71.9 
    60 28.6 32.5 53.4 76.3 
    61 31.9 35.9 57.3 79 
    62 41.7 46.4 68.4 86.8 
    63 42.5 47.3 69.6 88.1 
    64 48.1 52.5 74 90.2 
    65 53.2 57.3 77.7 91.7 
    66 56.2 59.6 79 91.8 
    67 61 64.2 81.7 92.8 
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Table 17 begins the exploration of the effects of introducing the Affordable Care Act 
(ACA). As discussed in the descriptive analysis, there are basically three groups that are relevant 
to the ACA. The first group is those who have no insurance on their current job and therefore no 
insurance in retirement. This group is simulated to have insurance after the ACA is introduced, 
and in the model this means that their medical costs are largely eliminated relative to the base 
simulation. The second group is those who have insurance on the job but no retiree health 
coverage. This is the group that is subject to the situation frequently called “job lock,” where 
they feel that they have to keep on working in order to keep their insurance. As noted previously, 
one would expect to find the largest effect of the ACA on this group, since after the introduction 
of the ACA this group will no longer feel that they have to continue working in order to keep 
health insurance. The third group is those who have health insurance in their job, and this 
insurance will continue when they are retired up to the Medicare eligibility age. The ACA will 
have only a small, if any, effect on the retirement behavior of this group. 
Table 17 relates to full-time work by individuals who have insurance in their job but no 
retiree insurance, that is, the individuals subject to job lock. The columns of the table pertain to 
the age at which the ACA is introduced. The first column pertains to the situation when the ACA 
is introduced at age 25. Since the simulations start at age 25, this simulation corresponds to the 
effects of a fully anticipated ACA over the full lifetime. The next three columns suppose that the 
individuals are 50, 55, and 60 at the time the ACA is introduced. Prior to those ages, the 
individuals have not anticipated the ACA, and had made labor force and savings decisions as 
though there would be no ACA. After the introduction of the ACA, the individuals reoptimize 
their decisions, given the labor force and savings decisions they have made up to that point. 
35 
 
Columns for ages after 60 are not included, since at age 65 Medicare becomes available and the 
ACA essentially becomes irrelevant.  
The figures in Table 17 are the percentages of individuals retired from full-time work in 
the relevant simulation, minus the percentage of individuals retired from full-time work in the 
base simulation, in which there was no ACA. For instance, the figure of 0.7 in the third column 
of the row for age 62 indicates that in the simulation for the introduction of the ACA at age 55, 
retirement from full-time work at age 62 was 0.7 of a percentage point higher than the 
corresponding percentage in the base simulation. In general, these percentages are relatively low, 
but even more interesting for the present research is that these percentages do not move much as 
one goes across the columns. That is, the effect of the ACA at a particular age does not change 
very much regardless of whether it was introduced two years ago or 20 years ago, or whether it 
has always been there. 
This last result is perhaps a bit surprising, so it may be useful to ask what might be 
generating it. The answer appears to be in the response of saving to the relatively small 
probability of encountering high health costs before age 65 when Medicare kicks in. Another 
way to ask the question is to think about how much of saving is attributable to the prospect of 
having high medical expenses before age 65. Since the probability of these expenses is fairly 
small, the answer is probably not much. In response to the possibility of these expenses, there are 
two possible outcomes. One is to accumulate resources before the expenses, and the other is to 
adjust consumption after the expenses. These results seem to indicate the latter, that is, 
cumulative saving is probably not that much different, especially relative to retirement saving, 
whether or not ACA has been around for a long time. 
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Table 17: Percentage Point Increase in Retirement from Full-Time Work for Sample with 
Insurance While Working But No Retiree Coverage 
 
ACA Introduction Age 
 25 50 55 60 25 50 55 60 
Age All Income Groups Low Income Group 
54 0.4 0.4 0 0 0.7 0.7 0 0 
55 0.3 0.3 0.1 0 0.5 0.5 0.1 0 
56 0.3 0.3 0.2 0 0.5 0.5 0.1 0 
57 0.4 0.4 0.2 0 0.5 0.6 0.2 0 
58 0.3 0.3 0.3 0 0.3 0.3 0.2 0 
59 0.4 0.4 0.3 0 0.4 0.4 0.3 0 
60 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.4 0.4 0.5 0.4 0.2 
61 0.4 0.5 0.5 0.4 0.2 0.3 0.3 0.3 
62 0.6 0.7 0.7 0.6 0.6 0.7 0.7 0.6 
63 0.4 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.5 
64 0.4 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.7 
65 0.3 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.3 
66 -0.1 0 0.1 0.1 0 0.1 0.2 0.1 
67 0 0.1 0.1 0.1 0 0.1 0.2 0.1 
 
Middle Income Group High Income Group 
54 0.4 0.4 0 0 0.2 0.2 0 0 
55 0.3 0.3 0 0 0.2 0.2 0.2 0 
56 0.3 0.3 0.2 0 0.2 0.2 0.2 0 
57 0.3 0.3 0.3 0 0.3 0.3 0.3 0 
58 0.4 0.4 0.4 0 0.4 0.4 0.4 0 
59 0.5 0.5 0.5 0 0.4 0.5 0.5 0 
60 0.7 0.7 0.7 0.6 0.5 0.6 0.6 0.6 
61 0.6 0.6 0.6 0.6 0.4 0.5 0.5 0.4 
62 0.7 0.8 0.7 0.7 0.3 0.4 0.4 0.4 
63 0.7 0.7 0.7 0.7 0.3 0.4 0.4 0.4 
64 0.5 0.6 0.5 0.5 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.4 
65 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.2 0.3 0.3 0.3 
66 0 0 0.1 0.1 0 0.1 0.1 0.1 
67 0 0.1 0.1 0.1 0 0.1 0.1 0.1 
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Table 17 (continued): Percentage Point Increase in Retirement from Full-Time Work for 
Sample with Insurance While Working But No Retiree Coverage  
 
 
ACA Introduction Age 
 25 50 55 60 25 50 55 60 
Age Good Health Group Poor Health Group 
54 0.3 0.3 0 0 0.6 0.6 0 0 
55 0.3 0.3 0.1 0 0.5 0.5 0.3 0 
56 0.3 0.3 0.1 0 0.6 0.7 0.5 0 
57 0.3 0.3 0.1 0 0.5 0.6 0.5 0 
58 0.3 0.3 0.2 0 0.5 0.6 0.6 0 
59 0.4 0.4 0.3 0 0.5 0.6 0.6 0 
60 0.6 0.6 0.5 0.4 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.5 
61 0.5 0.6 0.5 0.4 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.5 
62 0.5 0.6 0.6 0.5 0.7 0.7 0.8 0.8 
63 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.6 0.6 
64 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.6 
65 0.2 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.2 0.3 0.3 0.3 
66 0 0.1 0.1 0.1 0 0 0.1 0.1 
67 0 0.1 0.1 0.1 0 0.1 0.1 0.1 
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This does not imply that ACA has no effect on retirement. The ACA has some wealth 
effect because it offsets some of the potential future expenses, and it also makes the value of 
current employment somewhat less for individuals currently covered in their jobs but not as 
retirees, since with ACA they would be covered anyway even if retired. Both of these effects 
reduce incentives for full-time work, which is what the table suggests. But if the effect is coming 
from these considerations and not from accumulated savings, then the magnitude of the effect 
will not depend very much on the length of time since the ACA was introduced. 
The first panel in the table deals with the overall sample of those with insurance while 
working but without retiree health insurance, while the next three panels deal with the three 
income groups within this overall sample. One might expect individuals in the lowest income 
group to have the largest effect, but this does not seem to be the case. One explanation is that 
individuals with low incomes are more likely to have little savings, and if high medical expenses 
arise they fall back on the safety net (Hubbard, Skinner, and Zeldes, 1995), which for the 
purposes of these simulations takes the form of a minimum consumption standard. The middle 
income group is less likely to follow this route, so their response to the ACA is a bit more 
pronounced. For the high income group, on the other hand, medical expenses (which are 
assumed to be dependent on health status but not on income) are a smaller percentage of income, 
and hence the responses will be more muted. 
The last two panels of the table deal with the responses of those in good health and those 
in poor health, respectively. One might expect the group in poor health to be more responsive to 
the introduction of the ACA, and that does indeed seem to be the case. Individuals in poor health 
face higher medical expenses and would be more reluctant to give up full-time jobs and expose 
themselves to these expenses without the ACA. With the ACA, however, this disincentive to 
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retire disappears, and they are therefore more likely to increase their retirement rates relative to 
those with lower medical expenses. Even here, though, the effect is not large. 
Table 18 looks at increases in retirement from full-time work for the sample whose 
individuals are not covered by health insurance either in their job or in retirement, that is, for 
those who are not covered at all in the absence of the ACA. In these simulations, a rather 
unexpected pattern emerges: With the ACA, these individuals are simulated to reduce retirement 
from full-time work before about age 62 but increase it thereafter. That is, before age 62 they 
actually increase full-time work in the presence of the ACA. 
One explanation for this pattern relies on the fact that the bulk of individuals with no 
insurance on their full-time jobs are relatively low-wage workers with relatively little, if any, 
savings. If they leave work before age 62, the Social Security early entitlement age, their 
alternative may be to rely on the minimum consumption standard, in which case their medical 
expenses are effectively covered. If they work, however, they must pay their medical expenses 
out of their earnings, which effectively reduces their compensation from which they can 
purchase other consumption goods. In essence, for this group, they are insured if they leave their 
full-time jobs, but not if they remain in their jobs. Introducing the ACA reduces the medical 
expenses they incur if they remain in their jobs and hence effectively increases their 
compensation, which in turn induces them to increase their full-time work. 
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Table 18: Percentage Point Increase in Retirement from Full-Time Work for Sample with 
No Insurance Coverage 
ACA Introduction Age 
25 50 55 60 25 50 55 60 
All Income Groups Low Income Group 
Age 54 -0.4 -0.3 0 0 -0.2 -0.1 0 0 
55 -0.4 -0.2 -0.2 0 -0.2 0 0 0 
56 -0.4 -0.2 -0.2 0 -0.4 -0.2 -0.2 0 
57 -0.4 -0.2 -0.2 0 -0.3 -0.1 -0.1 0 
58 -0.4 -0.2 -0.2 0 -0.3 -0.1 0 0 
59 -0.5 -0.3 -0.2 0 -0.5 -0.2 -0.2 0 
60 -0.5 -0.3 -0.3 -0.4 -0.5 -0.2 -0.2 -0.3 
61 -0.4 -0.1 -0.1 -0.2 -0.4 -0.1 -0.1 -0.1 
62 -0.2 0 0 -0.1 -0.2 0.1 0 0 
63 -0.2 0 0 -0.1 -0.1 0.1 0.1 0 
64 0 0.2 0.1 0.1 0 0.2 0.2 0.1 
65 0.2 0.4 0.4 0.3 0.1 0.3 0.3 0.2 
66 0.1 0.3 0.3 0.2 0.1 0.3 0.3 0.2 
67 0.1 0.3 0.2 0.2 0.1 0.3 0.3 0.2 
Middle Income Group High Income Group 
54 -1 -0.9 0 0 -0.6 -0.4 0 0 
55 -1 -0.9 -0.6 0 -0.3 -0.2 -0.2 0 
56 -0.8 -0.7 -0.5 0 -0.3 -0.1 -0.1 0 
57 -1.1 -0.9 -0.8 0 -0.3 -0.1 -0.1 0 
58 -0.9 -0.8 -0.7 0 -0.2 0 -0.1 0 
59 -0.9 -0.7 -0.7 0 -0.1 0 0 0 
60 -0.8 -0.6 -0.6 -0.7 0 0.1 0.1 -0.1 
61 -0.5 -0.3 -0.3 -0.4 -0.1 0 0 -0.1 
62 0 0.2 0.2 0.1 -0.1 0 0 -0.1 
63 -0.1 0 0 -0.1 -0.3 -0.1 -0.2 -0.2 
64 0.1 0.2 0.2 0.1 0 0.1 0.1 0 
65 0.3 0.5 0.5 0.4 0.3 0.5 0.5 0.4 
66 0.2 0.4 0.3 0.2 0.1 0.3 0.2 0.2 
67 0.2 0.3 0.3 0.2 0.1 0.2 0.2 0.1 
Age 
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Table 18 (continued): Percentage Point Increase in Retirement from Full-Time Work for 
Sample with No Insurance Coverage 
 
 
  
ACA Introduction Age 
  25 50 55 60 25 50 55 60 
  
Good Health Group Poor Health Group 
Age 54 -0.4 -0.3 0 0 -0.5 -0.3 0 0 
 
55 -0.4 -0.3 -0.2 0 -0.4 -0.1 -0.2 0 
 
56 -0.5 -0.3 -0.3 0 -0.3 0 0 0 
 
57 -0.5 -0.3 -0.3 0 -0.2 0 0 0 
 
58 -0.4 -0.2 -0.2 0 -0.3 -0.1 -0.1 0 
 
59 -0.6 -0.4 -0.3 0 -0.3 0 0 0 
 
60 -0.5 -0.3 -0.2 -0.4 -0.4 -0.1 -0.1 -0.3 
 
61 -0.5 -0.3 -0.2 -0.2 -0.2 0.1 0.1 0 
 
62 -0.2 0 0 -0.1 0 0.2 0.2 0.1 
 
63 -0.2 -0.1 -0.1 -0.1 0 0.2 0.1 0.1 
 
64 0 0.2 0.2 0.1 0 0.2 0.2 0.1 
 
65 0.2 0.4 0.4 0.3 0.2 0.4 0.3 0.2 
 
66 0.1 0.4 0.3 0.2 0.1 0.3 0.2 0.2 
 
67 0.2 0.4 0.3 0.2 0 0.2 0.1 0.1 
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At age 62, however, they are eligible for Social Security, and the medical expenses do, in 
fact, reduce the amount available for consumption regardless of whether or not they are working. 
At this point the ACA no longer alters the relative incentives between work and retirement, and 
the remaining incentives have to do with the income effect of the ACA. These incentives work in 
the direction of inducing earlier retirement, so the signs of the effects of the ACA tend to change 
around the time of the Social Security early entitlement age. 
Looking at the three income groups in the second through fourth panels, it is evident that 
the middle income group of the sample with no insurance has the greatest effect of the 
introduction of the ACA. In the face of high medical expenses, low-income workers are more 
likely to be driven to the minimum consumption standard than are middle-income workers, and 
at that point they become effectively insured. High-income workers, on the other hand, are 
proportionately less affected by medical expenses, and hence, have a relatively low response to 
the introduction of the ACA. 
Tables 19 and 20 repeat the exercises reported in Tables 17 and 18 except that these 
tables look at full retirement rather than retirement from full-time work. The effects of the ACA 
on full retirement seem to follow the same general patterns as for retirement from full-time work, 
however, so much the same discussion as applied to Tables 17 and 18 also applies to these 
tables. 
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Table 19: Percentage Point Increase in Full Retirement for Sample with Insurance While 
Working But No Retiree Coverage 
 
 
  
ACA Introduction Age 
  
25 50 55 60 25 50 55 60 
  
All Income Groups Low Income Group 
Age 54 0.2 0.2 0 0 0.4 0.4 0 0 
 
55 0.2 0.2 0.1 0 0.4 0.4 0.1 0 
 
56 0.3 0.3 0.1 0 0.6 0.6 0.3 0 
 
57 0.3 0.4 0.3 0 0.5 0.6 0.2 0 
 
58 0.2 0.3 0.3 0 0.2 0.3 0.2 0 
 
59 0.3 0.3 0.3 0 0.2 0.2 0.2 0 
 
60 0.3 0.4 0.4 0.3 0.2 0.3 0.3 0.2 
 
61 0.4 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.4 
 
62 0.3 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.3 0.3 0.4 0.4 
 
63 0.3 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.4 
 
64 0.2 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.5 
 
65 0.3 0.3 0.4 0.4 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.4 
 
66 -0.1 0 0.1 0.1 0 0 0.1 0.2 
 
67 -0.1 0 0.1 0.1 -0.1 -0.1 0 0.1 
  
Middle Income Group High Income Group 
 
54 0.2 0.2 0 0 0.1 0.1 0 0 
 
55 0.2 0.2 0 0 0.1 0.1 0.1 0 
 
56 0.2 0.2 0.1 0 0.2 0.2 0.2 0 
 
57 0.2 0.2 0.2 0 0.2 0.2 0.2 0 
 
58 0.2 0.2 0.2 0 0.2 0.3 0.3 0 
 
59 0.3 0.3 0.4 0 0.4 0.4 0.4 0 
 
60 0.5 0.5 0.6 0.5 0.3 0.4 0.4 0.4 
 
61 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.3 0.4 0.4 0.4 
 
62 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.3 0.3 0.4 0.4 
 
63 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.2 0.3 0.3 0.3 
 
64 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.1 0.2 0.2 0.2 
 
65 0.4 0.4 0.5 0.5 0.2 0.3 0.3 0.3 
 
66 -0.1 0 0.1 0.1 -0.1 0 0.1 0.1 
 
67 -0.1 -0.1 0 0 -0.1 0 0.1 0.1 
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Table 19 (continued): Percentage Point Increase in Full Retirement for Sample with 
Insurance While Working But No Retiree Coverage 
 
 
  
ACA Introduction Age 
  25 50 55 60 25 50 55 60 
  
Good Health Group Poor Health Group 
Age 54 0.2 0.2 0 0 0.3 0.3 0 0 
 
55 0.1 0.1 0 0 0.3 0.3 0.2 0 
 
56 0.2 0.2 0.1 0 0.4 0.5 0.4 0 
 
57 0.3 0.3 0.2 0 0.3 0.4 0.3 0 
 
58 0.2 0.2 0.2 0 0.3 0.4 0.4 0 
 
59 0.3 0.3 0.2 0 0.3 0.4 0.4 0 
 
60 0.4 0.5 0.4 0.4 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.3 
 
61 0.4 0.5 0.5 0.4 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 
 
62 0.3 0.4 0.4 0.3 0.4 0.4 0.5 0.6 
 
63 0.4 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 
 
64 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.2 0.3 0.3 0.4 
 
65 0.3 0.3 0.4 0.4 0.3 0.3 0.4 0.4 
 
66 0 0 0.1 0.1 0 0 0.1 0.1 
 
67 -0.1 0 0.1 0.1 -0.1 0 0.1 0.1 
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Table 20: Percentage Point Increase in Full Retirement for Sample with No Insurance 
Coverage 
  
ACA Introduction Age 
  25 50 55 60 25 50 55 60 
  
All Income Groups Low Income Group 
Age 54 -0.4 -0.2 0 0 -0.2 -0.1 0 0 
 
55 -0.5 -0.3 -0.3 0 -0.4 -0.2 -0.1 0 
 
56 -0.4 -0.3 -0.2 0 -0.3 -0.1 -0.1 0 
 
57 -0.5 -0.4 -0.3 0 -0.5 -0.3 -0.2 0 
 
58 -0.5 -0.3 -0.3 0 -0.4 -0.2 -0.1 0 
 
59 -0.7 -0.5 -0.4 0 -0.7 -0.4 -0.4 0 
 
60 -0.5 -0.3 -0.3 -0.4 -0.7 -0.4 -0.4 -0.4 
 
61 -0.5 -0.2 -0.2 -0.2 -0.5 -0.3 -0.2 -0.2 
 
62 -0.5 -0.3 -0.3 -0.4 -0.7 -0.5 -0.5 -0.5 
 
63 -0.4 -0.2 -0.2 -0.3 -0.5 -0.3 -0.3 -0.3 
 
64 -0.2 0 -0.1 -0.1 -0.4 -0.2 -0.2 -0.2 
 
65 0.4 0.6 0.6 0.5 0.4 0.6 0.6 0.5 
 
66 0.2 0.4 0.4 0.3 0.2 0.4 0.4 0.3 
 
67 0.1 0.3 0.3 0.2 0.1 0.3 0.2 0.2 
  
Middle Income Group High Income Group 
 
54 -0.9 -0.9 0 0 -0.3 -0.2 0 0 
 
55 -1.1 -1 -0.8 0 -0.3 -0.1 -0.2 0 
 
56 -0.8 -0.7 -0.6 0 -0.2 -0.1 -0.1 0 
 
57 -0.9 -0.8 -0.7 0 -0.4 -0.2 -0.3 0 
 
58 -0.8 -0.7 -0.6 0 -0.4 -0.2 -0.3 0 
 
59 -1.2 -1.1 -1.1 0 -0.3 -0.1 -0.2 0 
 
60 -0.5 -0.4 -0.4 -0.6 -0.1 0 0 -0.2 
 
61 -0.4 -0.2 -0.2 -0.3 -0.2 -0.1 -0.1 -0.2 
 
62 -0.5 -0.4 -0.4 -0.5 -0.2 0 -0.1 -0.1 
 
63 -0.3 -0.1 -0.1 -0.2 -0.3 -0.2 -0.2 -0.3 
 
64 0 0.2 0.1 0 0 0.1 0.1 0 
 
65 0.4 0.5 0.5 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.6 0.5 
 
66 0.3 0.5 0.5 0.3 0.1 0.3 0.2 0.2 
 
67 0.2 0.4 0.4 0.2 0.1 0.3 0.2 0.2 
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Table 20 (continued): Percentage Point Increase in Full Retirement for Sample with No 
Insurance Coverage 
  
ACA Introduction Age 
  25 50 55 60 25 50 55 60 
  
Good Health Group Poor Health Group 
Age 54 -0.4 -0.3 0 0 -0.6 -0.4 0 0 
 
55 -0.5 -0.3 -0.2 0 -0.5 -0.2 -0.2 0 
 
56 -0.3 -0.2 -0.2 0 -0.5 -0.3 -0.2 0 
 
57 -0.6 -0.4 -0.4 0 -0.5 -0.3 -0.3 0 
 
58 -0.5 -0.4 -0.3 0 -0.5 -0.3 -0.2 0 
 
59 -0.7 -0.6 -0.5 0 -0.5 -0.3 -0.3 0 
 
60 -0.6 -0.4 -0.4 -0.5 -0.4 -0.2 -0.2 -0.3 
 
61 -0.5 -0.4 -0.3 -0.3 -0.3 -0.1 -0.1 -0.1 
 
62 -0.6 -0.5 -0.5 -0.5 -0.3 0 -0.1 -0.2 
 
63 -0.5 -0.4 -0.4 -0.4 -0.1 0.1 0.1 0 
 
64 -0.2 -0.1 -0.1 -0.1 -0.1 0.2 0.1 0.1 
 
65 0.5 0.7 0.7 0.6 0.3 0.6 0.5 0.5 
 
66 0.1 0.3 0.3 0.2 0.1 0.3 0.3 0.2 
 
67 0.1 0.3 0.3 0.2 0.1 0.3 0.3 0.2 
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V. Conclusions 
Simulations based on a previously estimated structural model of retirement and saving 
suggest that the group subject to the largest marginal effect on their retirement incentives from 
Affordable Care Act — those who initially had health insurance at work but not in retirement — 
will increase their retirement as a result of passage of ACA. But the reduction in work effort is 
quite modest, amounting to an increase of half a percentage point per year in the percent retired. 
These simulations also suggest that the period of adjustment to a change in the law will be 
relatively short. In contrast, they suggest that ACA will reduce the probability of retirement at 
earlier ages by those who had no health insurance coverage either at work or in retirement prior 
to ACA. 
Empirical data indicating the actual changes in retirement and retirement intentions 
observed to date are consistent with the simulations based on the structural model estimated with 
pre-ACA data. There is no statistically significant evidence in HRS panel data that respondents 
who initially had health insurance at work, but not in retirement, have begun to retire early as a 
result of ACA. Nor is there evidence of changes in expected retirement dates and dates of 
claiming Social Security as a result of ACA adoption.  
The simulations based on the structural model lead us to expect only small changes in 
retirement as a result of ACA, even in the long term.  
It is, however, possible that once ACA has been in place for a while, changes might be 
found in actual and expected retirements. The current strong penalties for not conforming to 
ACA have only just come on line. Thus at the time of the HRS survey of Mid Boomers in 2014, 
people may not yet have focused on the implications of the law for their looming retirement, and 
therefore may not have changed either their retirement behavior or their retirement intensions in 
response. Moreover, looking forward to the 2016 HRS survey results, there are a couple of other 
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reasons why one might expect to eventually find some effects of ACA on retirement. First, 
despite a temporary program to subsidize employer-provided health insurance for early retirees 
(WHITEHOUSE.GOV/HEALTH REFORM), employer offerings of early retiree coverage will 
probably decline further (Kaiser Family Foundation, 2016). As a result, the group most affected 
by the change in incentives (the “current employer coverage/early retiree coverage NOT 
available”) will grow. That would yield larger effects in the medium/long run. Second, should 
more states expand Medicaid over time, that would also mean a larger effect.  
Nevertheless, we did not uncover any evidence to suggest that ACA will have large 
effects on retirement. Thus the effects of ACA on retirement would, at most, have only a minor 
influence on any evaluations of ACA. Both supporters and critics will have to look elsewhere 
when drawing conclusions about the ACA’S welfare effects.  
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Appendix Table 1: Number of Respondents by the Source of Insurance for Early Boomers in 2004 and 2008- Same Sample 
 2008 
2004 Current 
Employer 
 
 
 
1 
Previous 
Employer 
 
 
 
2 
Self 
Emp-
loyed 
Bus-
iness 
3 
Spouse 
Employer 
– current 
or former 
 
4 
Private 
Insurance 
Purchase 
 
 
5 
Medicare 
(disabil-
ity?) 
 
 
6 
Medi-
caid 
 
 
 
7 
Military 
 
 
 
 
8 
No 
insur-
ance 
 
 
11 
Row Total 
 
 
 
12 
1-Current Employer 
 
648 28 7 26 9 0 0 5 43 766 
59 percent 
2-Previous Employer 6 22 0 1 1 0 0 2 4 36 
3 percent 
3-Self Employed 
Business 
4 1 25 5 6 0 0 0 2 43 
3 percent 
4-Spouse Employer – 
current or former 
36 3 2 137 2 0 0 1 11 192 
15 percent 
5-Private Insurance 
Purchase (includes 
AARP and others) 
13 1 10 3 16 0 0 0 11 54 
4 percent 
6-Medicare (disability?) 0 0 0 1 0 2 0 0 0 3 
0 percent 
7-Medicaid 
 
3 0 0 0 2 2 0 0 6 13 
1 percent 
8- Military 
 
3 0 0 0 0 0 0 10 2 15 
1 percent 
9-No insurance 
 
46 2 1 22 11 0 4 4 96 186 
14 percent 
10-Column Total 759 
58 percent 
57 
4 percent 
46 
4 percent 
195 
15 percent 
47 
4 percent 
4 
0 percent 
4 
0 
percen
t 
22 
2 percent 
174 
13 
percent 
1,309 
100 
percent 
* This sample is constrained to include those who were currently employed in 2004 and in 2008. 
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Appendix Table 2: Expected Ages of Social Security Benefit Claiming and Retirement, 
weighted* 
 2010 2012 2014 
Expected Age of Benefit Claiming 
HI on Job; No HI in Retirement in 
2010 
65.4 
 
65.4 
 
65.3 
 
No HI on Job; No HI in Retirement 
in 2010 
65.0 
 
65.2 
 
64.7 
 
HI on Job; HI in Retirement in 
2010 
64.9 
 
65.3 
 
64.8 
 
Expected Age of Retirement 
HI on Job; No HI in Retirement in 
2010 
64.3 65.0 65.1 
No HI on Job; No HI in Retirement 
in 2010 
64.7 64.8 65.0 
HI on Job; HI in Retirement in 
2010 
64.3 64.9 64.6 
*Similar to Table 12 but with respondents with missing claim age or retirement age excluded. 
Number of observations in the sample is 962. 
